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Abstract In this study into the player’s emotional the-
ory of mind of gameplaying agents, we investigate how
an agent’s behaviour and the player’s own performance
and emotions shape the recognition of a frustrated be-
haviour. We focus on the perception of frustration as it
is a prevalent affective experience in human-computer
interaction. We present a testbed game tailored towards
this end, in which a player competes against an agent
with a frustration model based on theory. We collect
gameplay data, an annotated ground truth about the
player’s appraisal of the agent’s frustration, and ap-
ply face recognition to estimate the player’s emotional
state. We examine the collected data through correla-
tion analysis and predictive machine learning models,
and find that the player’s observable emotions are not
correlated highly with the perceived frustration of the
agent. This suggests that our subject’s theory of mind
is a cognitive process based on the gameplay context.
Our predictive models—using ranking support vector
machines—corroborate these results, yielding moder-
ately accurate predictors of players’ theory of mind.
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1 Introduction
Understanding how we recognise and feel about ar-
tificially simulated emotional behaviour is central to
the design of believable characters featured in modern,
narrative-heavy AAA games and the research of emo-
tional modelling and affective computing. Arguably, it
is generally complex to unravel how we feel other actors
(humans or agents) feel. It is also largely unknown how
we represent others’ emotional and cognitive patterns
according to the fundamental process known as the the-
ory of mind [24, 38, 40]: the feeling of how others feel.
Traditionally, the Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to
the mental models we form about others’ higher order
beliefs. However, recent studies shed light on the emo-
tional components of ToM [38, 45] as well. Throughout
this paper we use a taxonomy of cognitive and emo-
tional representation, which relies on the belief-order
attribution hierarchy [37]. According to this taxonomy
we refer to our own beliefs and feelings as zero-order
representation and our mental model of another actor’s
beliefs and feelings as first-order representation. In this
regard, a second-order representation would be another
actor’s recognition of our own judgement (i.e. “it knows
I know its state”). However, here we focus only on the
players’ recognition of emotion: specifically, their first-
order representation of the agent’s frustration.
We argue that modelling reliably a user’s ToM can
be viewed as the holy grail of not just user research and
user experience design, but also adaptive and creative
computation for any task that involves user-agent inter-
actions. In games, modelling ToM could revolutionise
adaptivity and personalisation—e.g. in the form of dy-
namic difficulty adjustment, procedural content genera-
tion, interactive narrative etc.—as our knowledge about
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the player’s understanding of game agents would afford
us more nuanced control over the experience [51].
We explore the player’s emotional ToM from both
statistical and predictive modelling, investigating how
the gameplay context and the player’s emotional state
during play affect their assessment of the agent’s be-
haviour through two different lens. We process our met-
rics (both input and output) in an ordinal fashion, ac-
counting for both absolute (i.e mean values) and rela-
tive (i.e. range of fluctuation) measures [29]. To conduct
our experiments, we introduce the MAZING testbed
game, in which the player competes against an artificial
agent designed to exhibit frustrated behaviour based
on a top-down model inspired by the theory of com-
puter frustration [5]. We focus on frustration as one of
the most prevalent and context-dependent affective out-
comes of human-computer interaction. The main goals
of our study are (a) to investigate the relationship be-
tween the gameplay context, manifestations of player
emotion, and the first-order representation of the per-
ceived frustration of the agent based on its behaviour,
while (b) to explore different ways of processing the
self-reported ToM.
This paper is novel to the field of games user re-
search and affective computing as it introduces a player-
centred approach to ToM in human-agent interaction.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time ToM
is examined within human-agent scenarios, where the
focus is not on the model of the agent per se but rather
on the players’ first-order affective ToM process. Al-
though most studies conceptualise ToM as a highly cog-
nitive construct, we focus on the emotional component
of the process and attempt to shed light on the ways
players perceive how emotional agents feel.
2 Theoretical Background
This section provides the theoretical basis for our study
and the agent model. We introduce the processes be-
hind cognitive and affective aspects of ToM and present
the theory of computer frustration which inspired our
top-down frustration model of the gameplaying agent.
2.1 Theory of Mind and Emotions
As briefly mentioned in Section 1, the Theory of Mind
(ToM) is the concept of high-level mental models. Al-
though traditional views focused on the representation
of cognitive processes [24], the concept has been re-
cently extended with an affective dimension [38, 45].
ToM plays a central role in social cognition and inter-
action [21] as it enables humans to hold and manage
prevalent representations of other actors, their beliefs,
emotions, and cognitive processes.
ToM has been investigated from the late ’70s [7, 40]
and in the context of autonomous multiagent interac-
tion from the mid-90s [1]. However, it is only recently
being considered in game design and game user re-
search. Although the bulk of studies focus on agent-
based ToM modelling [3, 13], other venues consider
player-player interactions [23, 26, 33] and player-game
involvement [6]. Motivated by the lack of a human-
agent interaction perspective, this paper explores cog-
nitive and emotional manifestations of a human’s ToM
while interacting with a game agent. While tradition-
ally ToM is concerned with beliefs, trait judgements
and strategic decisions [44], we follow Damasio’s so-
matic marker hypothesis [12] and approach ToM from
an emotion-centric perspective.
Based on neuroscientific evidence, we differentiate
between a cognitive and an affective ToM. Cognitive
ToM is focusing on belief and knowledge representa-
tions, while affective ToM processes are involved in
the representation of emotions [46]. However, these pro-
cesses are not mutually exclusive [45]. Cognitive ToM is
generally associated with brain regions involved in au-
tonomic responses and a choice-selection downstream of
the decision making process [20, 48]. Meanwhile, affec-
tive ToM involves additional areas tied to the affective
and cognitive regulation of decision making processes
as described in the somatic marker hypothesis [12, 14].
Evidence also shows that affective ToM relies on cog-
nitive empathy, which is the understanding of others’
emotions, and to a lesser degree on emotional conta-
gion, a form of emotional mimicry [45]. This suggests
that while it is possible to represent other actors’ men-
tal states cognitively, affective processes impact the for-
mulation and regulation of such mental models.
The state of the art research in virtual agents, in-
ferring goals and recognising false beliefs, is paving the
way in developing bottom-up solutions for modelling
artificial ToM [41]. Such approaches, however, gener-
ally do not consider modelling affective aspects of ToM
[3, 13, 41]. Adopting the typology of [41] to human
players, we focus on agent-specific ToM—as opposed
to general ToM, which stipulates a general predictive
system—and turn our investigation towards how play-
ers formulate the cognitive and affective components of
ToM with regards to game-playing agents.
2.2 Computer Frustration Theory
This explorative first study of player-agent ToM ad-
dresses perceptions of frustration. Frustration is one
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Fig. 1 Optimal level of human performance based on [25].
of the most common complex affective responses ex-
perienced during human-computer interaction [5], with
distinctive cognitive and behavioural patterns [9]. The
model we use for our game agents relies on the prin-
ciples of the computer frustration theory [5] which is
based on the work of [25] and [2]. Computer frustration
is a complex model which incorporates pre-emotional
appraisal, immediate emotional response, and long last-
ing mood [5]. Computer frustration is positioned within
the information processing theories of cognition and
emotion [10, 36, 42], by emphasising its role in pre-
emotional appraisal.
According to the theory, frustration is triggered by
the lack of anticipated change and manifests as non-
specific arousal in the information processing system,
leading to an eventual cognitive performance dysfunc-
tion. Computer frustration differentiates between inci-
dent, session, and post-session frustration and focuses
on self-efficacy, appraisal, and emotional outcomes of
human-computer interaction. However, given the fast-
paced nature of the game we designed for testing our hy-
potheses, in this paper we concentrate on the short-term
effects and functions of frustration. Computer frustra-
tion further predicts that the severity of the interrup-
tions and the time lost are the primary causes of in-
cident level (moment-to-moment) frustration—whereas
low self-efficacy and negative mood have a greater effect
on session level and post-session outcomes.
However, not all frustrating events are detrimen-
tal to one’s performance. Instead, computer frustration
posits a bell-curve-like function between the level of
arousal and performance [5], based on a Hebbian inter-
pretation (Fig. 1) of the Yerkes-Dodson Law [54]. Due
to the connection between arousal and performance,
frustration initially has a positive effect by limiting pe-
ripheral processes (both in perception and information
processing), and thus helps focus on the task at hand.
This enhancing effect is especially true if the frustration
originates from unmet goals or expectations (in-game
frustration) rather than from a failure to operate an
input device (at-game frustration) [22].
Fig. 2 Screenshot of MAZING, showing the player attacking
the agent (teal and red orbs) and a fire in the middle. A
previously laid fire is disappearing in an upper corner.
3 The MAZING Game
To collect data on a game featuring an artificial agent
that might exhibit frustration, we developed a 2D top-
down shooter game where a player and an artificial
agent compete (Fig. 2). The player scores points by
attacking the agent, while avoiding it. A game session
automatically ends after 1 minute.
In this study, we collect data from 4 playthroughs
per player: in each playthrough, the opponent is differ-
ent in terms of its level of frustration. The first agent
has no integrated model of frustration (the value of frus-
tration remains at 0). The other three agents are re-
active to their environment and vary their frustration
scores according to our model between 25−50, 50−75,
and 75 − 100. In the following sections we detail the
player’s and agent’s goals in this game.
3.1 Player’s Mechanics
Players move in a 2D maze (viewed from a top-down
perspective) using the WASD keys and aiming with the
mouse. Their movement speed is higher than the agent’s
base speed, giving the player an upper hand in most sce-
narios. They can also use a short dash ability every 2
seconds, which grants them a speed multiplier for less
than a second. The player scores points by damaging
the agent, via two modes of attack: (a) shooting up to 5
projectiles in quick succession by holding down the left
mouse-button, and (b) throwing bombs with the right
mouse-button. Bombs create fires where they land for 5
seconds (see Fig. 2). Passing through fire carpets deals
damage to both the player and the agent, and agents
are generally discouraged from moving through them.
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Both attacks recharge after a short period of time. If
the agent dies, players gain additional points. The game
obscures the maze with a partial fog-of-war, which hin-
ders visibility but does not block it completely. Play-
ers’ avatars have their field of view which illuminates
the map primarily in a cone in front of them and to a
lesser extent peripherally (including behind the avatar)
as shown in Fig. 2. Players lose if they collide with the
agent or if they lose all their hit points (players lose hit
points only when passing through fire carpets). Losing
decreases the player’s score and re-spawns the agent
and the player at their original locations.
3.2 Agent’s Mechanics
The agent only performs movement and low-level deci-
sion making. The agent carries out a basic search be-
haviour, quasi-randomly wandering around the map. At
the end of each search cycle, it picks a random point
and makes its way there, avoiding fires set by the player.
If the agent senses the player, it engages in a chase. To
sense the player, the agent possesses two distinct sen-
sors mimicking visual and auditory senses. The visual
sensor has an initial angle of 135◦ and a 10 metre radius.
The auditory senses affect an area around the agent
(initially also 10 metres), and have a low initial proba-
bility of detecting the player. If the player is standing
within the sensor’s reach, the agent’s auditory system
gradually increases the chance of detection and checks
for the player every second. Intervening walls cut the
auditory detection chance approximately in half. The
agent takes damage from each bullet-hit and damage
over time while standing in fire. The agent has many
hit points, but they are not replenished over time.
3.3 Agent’s Frustration Model
In order to provide the player with a quasi-believable,
responsive agent, we create a model of frustration that
drives the perception, movement and decision-making
of the agent. Based on the theory of computer frustra-
tion (see Section 2.2), we regard the severity of the set-
back as the primary variable for increasing frustration.
As the agent’s primary short-term goal is to catch the
player, all incidents that make it harder for the agent
to do so increase its frustration. These incidents include
player attacks, increasing distance from the player, and
losing sight of the player. Since we conceptualize frus-
tration as a form of arousal, we also give a light increase
to the agent’s frustration value whenever it spots the
player. Given that we wish to model incident level frus-
tration, we gradually decrease the agent’s frustration
whenever it is engaged in search behaviour.
Several stimuli from the game environment affect
the agent’s level of frustration. Frustration increases
if the path towards a goal calculated in the previous
frame is shorter than the current path (which indi-
cates new obstacles or a player getting away) and de-
creases (at a lower rate) if it is longer. Frustration is
increased when the agent spots the player and when
the agent loses sight of the player. Third, the agent’s
health has an effect on the agent’s frustration: frus-
tration increases with each projectile hit. Finally, frus-
tration slowly decreases in “resting periods”, when the
agent is in search behaviour. All modifiers to frustra-
tion are designed to provide players with more persis-
tent feedback [28], and ensure that the agent is getting
more frustrated throughout the session and cannot eas-
ily revert to its baseline.
The agent manifests frustration in several percepti-
ble ways:
Sensory system: Frustration causes increasingly
focused attention by decreasing the angle of the agent’s
field of view (FoV): a frustrated agent can see further
but at narrower angles, which can increase the chance
to spot the player. Similarly, the area of the agent’s
auditory sensors is smaller as frustration rises, but the
probability of hearing the player increases.
Movement: On a basic level, frustration increases
the agent’s movement speed and rotation speed linearly.
This improves the agent’s performance in spotting the
player initially. However, at high frustration levels it
produces erratic movements; coupled with the narrower
field of view, this can result in lower accuracy. Frustra-
tion also decreases the number of turns in search be-
haviour, simulating increasingly agitated behaviour.
Decision Making: Generally, the agent chooses
more dangerous paths towards its goal when frustrated.
The agent perceives paths through fire carpets as riskier;
it is more likely to take a risky option the more health it
has, or if a safe path to the player is considerably longer.
Frustration affects the risk taking factor and biases the
agent’s behaviour towards being more reckless.
Behavioural Outcomes: We designed our frus-
tration model to reflect observations in [9]. As frus-
tration increased during play tests in that study, ag-
gravated players took increasingly more and more risk,
rushed forward, and paid less and less attention to their
surroundings. In light of this research, we modify the
agent’s different systems to bias its behaviour towards
this direction. The focused sensors, increased speed,
and risk-taking behaviour is initially helpful for the
agent, creating a focused state and modelling the in-
creased attention of the agent. As frustration rises, the
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Fig. 3 The RankTrace software annotation tool with its phys-
ical interface.
system produces distinctly frustrated behaviour, includ-
ing hasty movements, reckless behaviour, and loss of pe-
ripheral senses. Higher frustration levels, however, lead
to rage signified by erratic, jerky movement and an al-
most complete shut down of the agent’s sensors. This
behaviour is a natural fallout of the model but it is also
in line with the frustration-aggression hypothesis [4].
4 Experimental Protocol
An experimental protocol was set up to collect data
from each participant in a set of matchups with as
diverse manifested frustration levels as possible. Each
participant started with a tutorial level to get acquainted
with the mechanics. After this, the participant played
against an agent in 4 play sessions; each session was
followed by a round of first-person annotation. During
the 4 play sessions we recorded a number of gameplay
metrics and players’ facial features which were used to
capture emotional manifestations during play. During
the setup phase of the experiment, the facial recogni-
tion software was calibrated to each individual.
4.1 Annotation
Following the core principles of ToM, we aim to assess
what our players think about the feelings of the agents
they have been observing and interacting with. Players
were asked to annotate the first-order representation of
the agent’s frustration—i.e. how frustrated they felt the
agent was. To achieve this, the participant’s last play
session was recorded and played back to the player as
a relived experience which the player annotated.
Labels of the agent’s frustration were collected via a
continuous annotation process which offers a more reli-
able and detailed picture of the underlying ground truth
[49] and captures the temporal dynamics of the experi-
ence [30]. Specifically, the players themselves annotated
their perceived frustration of the agent in every game
they played. Players used the RankTrace tool (Fig. 3),
which is an intuitive and validated [8, 29] annotation
tool for unbounded and continuous annotation.
The continuous frustration trace was then converted
to ordered ranks between 3-second segments of game-
play. Processing trace annotation as ordinal data pro-
vides higher reliability, generality and inter-rater agree-
ment [8, 29, 49] and is generally better aligned with the
relative nature of emotions [52].
4.2 Gameplay Features
We extracted 30 features in each gameplay session which
measure the position, kinaesthetic and sensory attributes
and internal states of the agent. We also consider the
position and actions of the player, and the interac-
tions between the player and the agent (e.g. distance
between player and agent). Collected features refer to
(a) the agent’s internal values: Frustration, Rotation
Speed, Risk-Taking Factor, Movement Speed, Hearing
Radius, Hearing Probability, FoV Radius, FoV Angle,
Number of Turns in Search; (b) agent behaviour: Search
Mode, Seeing Player, Chasing Player, Health, Distance
Travelled, Taking Risky Path, Change in Rotation; (c)
player behaviour: Distance Travelled, Shooting, Press-
ing Shoot on Cool-down, Mouse Movement, Health,
Dash Pressed, Dash Mode, Pressing Dash on Cool-down,
Change in Rotation, Bomb Dropping, Pressing Bomb
on Cool-down; or (d) gameplay context: Score, Agent
Distance From Player, Number of Fires.
4.3 Facial Emotion Recognition
Neuroscienctific evidence suggests that autonomic re-
sponses alone might not be sufficient when it comes to
measuring ToM [11, 20]. Emotional manifestations of
ToM during gameplay are based on facial expression
recognition and processing [34]. We extract facial fea-
tures and derive high-level facial expressions via the
Affdex SDK [32]. This system uses 34 facial landmarks
to provide continuous feedback (with a rate of 10-30
FPS) and calculates the presence and intensity of the
six basic emotions (anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness,
surprise) and contempt as well as estimates of the user’s
attention, engagement, and emotional valence from 14
facial action units. A total of 23 features are extracted
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from facial data captured during play and provided as
intensity values of each expression on a scale between 0
(expressionless) to 100 (exaggerated display).
5 Data Preprocessing and Methods
This section discusses our methods for data preprocess-
ing and presents two quantitative measures of our sig-
nals, metrics and annotations. Subsection 5.3 offers a
short introduction to preference learning, focusing on
ranking Support Vector Machine (rankSVM) which is
used to build predictive ToM models in Section 6.
5.1 Data Format and Preprocessing
Data from 80 play sessions is processed via a sliding-
window approach. During this process the gameplay is
segmented into consecutive equal-length windows with
no overlap (w) and the mean value (µA) and value range
(Aˆ) of each feature is calculated within each window
(see Fig. 4). Both µA and Aˆ are relevant (and dis-
parate): the mean values are an absolute metric which
is intuitive for comparing time windows (e.g. whether
the player believes the agent is more frustrated in one
window than in the next). In contrast, value range mea-
sures the amount of change in the given metrics within
a time window. While value range is expressed through
absolute values as well, it captures the relative changes
within a time window. Ordinal relationships of value
range between time windows can be intuitive for game-
play metrics or facial expressions (e.g. whether there
the game score changed more in one time window com-
pared to the next) but, admittedly, are less intuitive for
player annotation (e.g. whether the player saw a larger
increase in agent frustration within one time window
than in the next). Relative measures have been shown
to be more powerful predictors than absolute ones for
players’ own affective states [8]. We believe that the de-
gree of fluctuation within time windows can provide a
clearer picture of the aggravated and erratic behaviour
typical of frustrated players [9] and the fluctuation of
the player’s appraisal of the agent.
Based on relevant findings [30], we also consider the
reaction lag of annotation traces and facial expressions
(l). As in [8], in this study we parse our data with a
time window of 3 seconds (w = 3), with no overlap be-
tween windows and a lag of 1 second (l = 1). The lag
is introduced to the annotation and facial features to
account for the participants’ reaction time. When cal-
culating the lag, these values are shifted back (with the
first 1 second discarded) before applying the windowing
method. See Fig. 4 for an illustrative example.
Fig. 4 Calculating the mean and value range of different
signals (top to bottom: player annotation, facial data, game-
play data) through a sliding window approach. Features are
shifted back 1 second in relation to the gameplay metrics be-
fore cut into equal-length windows. Mean and value range are
calculated from the highlighted time window (window 2) and
its previous one (window 1) to derive rankings.
5.2 Method for Correlation Analysis
We use Kendall’s τ for all correlation analysis reported
in Section 6. Kendall’s τ is a non-parametric, bivari-
ate test of correlation for measuring monotonic rela-
tionships [35], which is suited for analysing the con-
cordance of ordinal data (unlike Pearson’s correlation)
and is a more robust metric than Spearman’s ρ but
outputs lower correlation values [18]. We treat signifi-
cant findings at 5% (α = 0.05) and highly significant
at 1% (α = 0.01) level. Because multiple comparisons
are being made with the same variable (the processed
annotation value) the Bonferroni correction is applied.
Thus, the correlation analysis measures significance at
α = 0.0553 and high significance at α =
0.01
53 for each
window-processing setup (µA and Aˆ).
5.3 Preference-based ToM Models
Preference learning (PL) is a supervised learning tech-
nique, in which an algorithm predicts a rank order be-
tween two or more data points. The name preference
learning originates from the most prominent applica-
tions of these algorithms in predicting user preferences
[27], however, as PL simply learns to predict ordinal
relationships in the data, it can be used to solve a wide
array of problems where it is important to conserve the
relative relation of datapoints. We use PL to investigate
the ordinal change in player’s emotional ToM as there
is a growing body of evidence that points towards the
ordinal nature of emotions [50, 52], which underlines
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cognitive and affective processes. Even though we fo-
cus on ordinal changes, in this paper we use the term
preference learning to differentiate our algorithms from
regression and classification algorithms. Contemporary
research highlights the limitations of regression in af-
fective computing [53]. PL is also proving more robust
than classification to handle ordinal annotations of af-
fect [8, 31, 52] as it preserves more information about
the global and local order of the data than traditional
class-based methods.
In this study we use a form of pairwise preference
learning, which leverages binary classification by trans-
forming the representation of the dataset from singular
datapoints to pairwise differences. During this trans-
formation each pair of input points (xi, xj) ∈ X2 are
observed based on their corresponding output (yi, yj) ∈
Y 2. Then a new dataset is constructed by assigning the
pairwise difference of each pairs of input xi−xj a label
λ = 1 and xj −xi a label λ = −1 if yi > yj (where xi is
preferred over xj). The resulting dataset reformulates
the problem, which can be solved by any kind of binary
classifier.
Because of the size of our dataset and the robust-
ness of the technique, we use Support Vector Machines
(SVM) for this task. SVMs are supervised learning algo-
rithms, originally designed to solve classification prob-
lems by maximizing the margin of a separating bound-
ary between data points [47]. Since their conception,
SVMs have been adapted to solve different problems
including regression analysis, clustering, and—in our
case—ranking [19]. In our experiments, we use the SVM
implementation found in the Preference Learning Tool-
box1 [16], based on the algorithm of [27].
6 Results
Following the experimental protocol of Section 4, we
collected data from 20 participants (described in Sec-
tion 6.1), processing them as ranks in terms of mean
values and value range of subsequent time windows.
These rankings are used to analyse the impact of in-
dividual features (with rank correlations presented in
Section 6.2) and to train predictive models which com-
bine some or all features linearly or non-linearly (in
Section 6.3).
6.1 Collected Data
Gameplay, facial and annotation data was collected from
20 participants (16 male, 4 female). Participants’ av-
erage age was 30 and all participants held or studied
1plt.institutedigitalgames.com
towards graduate degrees. All participants were expe-
rienced players, with half of them playing daily.
Each participant played and annotated four game-
play sessions lasting 1 minute each. With a sliding win-
dow of 3 seconds, a total of 1, 570 data points are col-
lected after partially missing data was removed. These
errors were caused by limitations of the face detection
software. To allow participants to play freely, a web-
camera was used to record their faces. As some par-
ticipants shifted in their chairs during gameplay, they
inadvertently moved out from the camera’s vision, re-
sulting in missing facial data.
In Section 6.2, 1, 570 individual datapoints are con-
sidered, where each datapoint represents a 3 second
snapshot of a player’s gameplay. For PL in Section 6.3,
differences between all datapoints are considered. As
discussed in Section 5.3, for each comparison two ob-
servations are made and this results in 27, 968 compar-
isons for µA and 22, 674 comparisons for Aˆ with a 50%
baseline.
6.2 Correlation Analysis
Table 1 shows the Kendall’s τ correlation values be-
tween annotated frustration of the agent and gameplay
features of the agent, the player, and their interaction
(i.e. General), as well as emotions estimated from fa-
cial detection. Correlations are calculated between the
mean values (µA) of features and the annotation data,
and between the value range (Aˆ) of a time window for
features and the annotation data. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 5.2, we apply Bonferroni correction to all signifi-
cance tests. Overall, there are only a handful of signifi-
cant correlations in both µA (18 out of 53 with p < 0.05)
and Aˆ (17 out of 53 with p < 0.05) cases. While most
of the action units and more complex emotional and
affective constructs measured by face recognition show
very weak correlations (generally below 0.1), features
relating to the agent’s behaviour and the gameplay con-
text show much stronger connections with the perceived
frustration of the agent.
Perhaps surprisingly, the absolute highest correla-
tion is with the player’s score—which naturally relies
both on the player’s and the agent’s performance. Even
though other gameplay features inform the score (i.e.
the agent’s health), score is the utmost indicator of the
success and failure of the player. Therefore, it provides
additional high-level information about the game state
compared to other, simpler features. It is also evident
that captured facial features including expressions of
the six basic emotions [15] and contempt show even
2CD: Cool-Down. An ability is recharging and unavailable.
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Table 1 Kendall’s τ correlation values between the annota-
tion of frustration and features captured from the game and
the web-cam. Values in bold are significant (p < 0.05); highly
significant values are underlined (p < 0.01). Bonferroni cor-
rection is applied to all significance tests.
Type Feature τ(µA) τ(Aˆ)
Agent model Agent Frustration Score 0.048 0.038
Agent Search Mode 0.176 -0.055
behaviour Seeing Player 0.174 0.134
Chasing Player 0.169 0.088
Distance Travelled 0.125 0.102
Rotation Speed 0.101 0.074
Speed 0.048 0.035
Change in Rotation 0.008 0.016
Taking Risky Path -0.002 0.008
Search Mode Length -0.057 0.034
Agent Health -0.154 0.065
sensory Hearing Probability 0.054 0.033
system View Radius 0.048 0.048
Risk Taking Factor 0.007 0.046
Hearing Radius -0.049 0.040
View Angle -0.049 0.035
Player Shooting 0.121 0.044
behaviour Tries to Shoot on CD2 0.104 0.073
Distance Travelled 0.072 0.026
Mouse Movement 0.029 -0.028
Change in Rotation 0.029 0.040
Health 0.018 0.033
Tries to Bomb on CD 0.014 0.047
Dash Pressed -0.008 -0.047
Dashing -0.009 -0.053
Bomb Dropped -0.012 0.036
Tries to Dash on CD -0.018 -0.027
General Score 0.240 0.070
gameplay Agent–Player Distance -0.141 0.069
Number of Fires 0.014 0.071
Basic Contempt 0.037 -0.035
emotions Sadness 0.017 -0.071
Fear 0.009 -0.058
Surprise 0.006 0.008
Joy 0.002 0.019
Anger 0.001 -0.041
Disgust -0.018 0.097
Affective Valence 0.077 -0.044
dimensions Attention -0.001 0.090
Engagement -0.070 0.000
Facial ChinRaise 0.115 0.040
action units BrowRaise 0.064 0.066
Smirk 0.028 -0.028
InnerBrowRaise 0.027 -0.077
LipSuck 0.004 -0.017
NoseWrinkle -0.021 0.094
EyeClosure -0.027 0.081
LipPucker -0.029 0.025
UpperLipRaise -0.033 0.069
LipPress -0.044 0.011
BrowFurrow -0.062 -0.053
Smile -0.067 0.043
MouthOpen -0.100 0.057
weaker correlations when the data is processed as µˆ
and no significant connections when it is processed as
µA. Since annotations of agent frustration have few sig-
nificant correlations with affective markers but many
significant correlations with contextual gameplay infor-
mation, we may conclude that the first-order represen-
tation of the agents in our experiments is a predomi-
nantly cognitive process.
6.3 Predictive Models
While a traditional correlation analysis can indicate
which individual features are good predictors of player
ToM, it does not test how these features perform when
combined in linear or non-linear fashions. We use pref-
erence learning methods (see Section 5.3) to construct
models based on different feature sets and with the in-
put and output processed either in an absolute or a rel-
ative fashion. The input features consist of 30 gameplay
features, 23 facial emotion manifestation features, and
their combination (see these 53 features in Section 4.2
and on Table 1). The output of our models are the ordi-
nal relation of pairwise differences between datapoints.
We infer these relation both in terms of mean values
(µA) and value ranges (Aˆ). We indicate the processing
of the input and output features with a right arrow be-
tween them (i.e. in case of an input processed as mean
values and output processed as value ranges the nota-
tion is µA → Aˆ). To test the robustness of our models,
we apply cross-participant validation: i.e. training the
model on data of 18 players and testing it on data of
two unseen players, repeated 10 times so that all play-
ers are validated. To measure the statistical significance
of the difference between models, two-tailed t-tests are
used with p < 0.05. When a model is tested against
multiple other models, the calculation of significance is
adjusted using the Bonferroni correction. Since 12 dif-
ferent models are compared, one model is significantly
different from all others at α = 0.0511 .
Figure 5 shows the 10-fold cross-validation accura-
cies of linear support vector machines (SVMs) and non-
linear SVMs with Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernels.
RBF emphasises the local proximity between input vec-
tors in a feature space, allowing for a non-linear measure
of match between vectors [47]. Both linear and RBF
SVMs use the C regularisation parameter to optimise
the trade-off between maximising the separating margin
and minimising the classification error, while the RBF
SVMs also rely on the γ hyperparameter to control the
weight given to datapoints during the kernel calcula-
tion. The input features and output (annotations) are
processed as mean value and value range separately,
leading to four combinations of input–output. Results
shown in Fig. 5 are from the best C and RBFγ values
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per model3 based on an exhaustive gradient search for
both the C and RBFγ parameters from 10−3 to 103
with powers of 10.
From Figure 5 it is evident that the modelling of per-
ceived frustration is a challenging predictive task. Both
linear and non-linear SVMs are performing less than
10% above the baseline, with the exception of µA → µA,
which reaches 67.5% on average (80.2% at best) based
on game features and 66.4% on average (81.7% at best)
based on all features. Based on the results of the corre-
lation analysis presented on Table 1, it is not surpris-
ing that features processed as Aˆ yield weaker results:
the best Aˆ → Aˆ models only reaching 58.4% on av-
erage and 62.9% at best based on gameplay features.
The best model combining both processing techniques
is µA → Aˆ with 60.2% average and 69% maximum ac-
curacy using gameplay features. While the best models
are achieved using gameplay features only, accuracies
for models based on facial features corroborate findings
of Section 6.2. In the µA → µA and Aˆ → Aˆ scenarios,
models based on facial recognition result in significantly
worse accuracies than other feature sets. There is no
significant difference, however, between models using
only gameplay features and when both feature sets are
combined together in a bimodal fashion. The same sig-
nificant differences are found with MannWhitney tests,
which does not assume a normal distribution, further
supporting our conclusions.
These results are supported by Table 1 and align
with the conclusion of Section 6.2 suggesting that the
first-order representation of the agent mainly relies on
the cognitive understanding of observable information
without much emotional feedback. The deliberative na-
ture of this mechanism might explain the weak pre-
dictions based on non-linear models, as players might
actively interpret and reflect on the context of the inter-
action instead of relying on their own affective response
or simple observations of the game state.
7 Discussion
This study examined the player’s theory of mind re-
garding a gameplaying artificial agent which was de-
signed to exhibit behavioural signs of frustration. The
test-bed game, MAZING, was designed for the study
based a contemporary theory of frustration in human-
computer interaction. Within MAZING, an AI oppo-
nent was designed for the player to interact with. We
3The best (C) and RBFγ values for each model are:
µA → µA: game: (0.1) 0.5; facial: (100) 0.1; all: (1) 0.01.
Aˆ→ Aˆ: game: (0.1) 0.5; facial: (10) 1; all: (0.1) 0.1.
Aˆ→ µA: game: (0.1) 0.1; facial: (0.1) 0.01; all: (0.1) 0.5.
µA → Aˆ: game: (0.5) 0.01; facial: (0.1) 0.01; all: (0.5) 0.01.
Fig. 5 Accuracies of linear SVM and best RBF SVM predic-
tive models, on different combinations of µA and Aˆ input and
output values (input → output). Results are averaged from
10-fold cross-validation folds, and error bars denote the 95%
confidence intervals.
collected first-person annotations of the player’s first-
order representation of the agent’s frustration and ex-
amined the player’s perception both through correla-
tion analysis and via predictive models.
Results indicate that the most prominent correla-
tions of the player’s appraisal of agent frustration is
the gameplay context, i.e. the performance and inter-
action of both player and agent. Our results also sug-
gest that the process of developing and maintaining a
ToM primarily relies on the understanding of the game-
play context, with no strong monotonic correlations to
visible signs of player emotion. Predictive models of a
player’s ToM showed that gameplay features alone are
more reliable predictors of how players appraise situa-
tions and perceive agent behaviour and frustration. On
the other hand, SVM models only had moderate success
in predicting players’ ToM.
Our results are corroborated by [17] and recent find-
ings of [43], which applied deep neural networks to the
mapping of basic emotions to gameplay events with
mixed outcomes. Just as their results, our research also
indicates that the ambiguity and underlying complex-
ity of emotions are not trivial to read and contextualise
through facial emotion manifestations, leading to inac-
curate predictions based on absolute measures of basic
emotions. The meta-review of [39] found that multi-
modal modelling generally outperforms unimodal meth-
ods in audio-, video-, and text-based analysis. Our re-
sults expand these findings to new modalities which
we capture through the gameplay logs (i.e. player be-
haviour and gameplay context) and provide additional
validity by showcasing the improved performance of
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models using both gameplay-based, and video-based
(facial features) modalities.
The primary limitation of our study is the ad-hoc
nature of the agent’s model of frustration: while the
model is inspired by contemporary theory and mani-
fests a varied but persistent behaviour, the testbed can-
not be validated based on the statistical analysis. Pre-
liminary comparisons between players’ annotations did
not show substantial differences between playthroughs
with agents exhibiting low or high frustration, but fu-
ture work should find a more granular method of val-
idating the internal models of the gameplaying agent
through experimentation. This could involve a focus on
basic, more universally recognised emotions, a more ex-
pressive agent, and more streamlined gameplay.
Another limitation was the lack of a ground truth
for the player’s own emotional state, as we relied in-
stead on detected emotion via facial expressions. While
the correlation analysis showed little relationship be-
tween player emotion and perceptions of frustration,
this could be instead due to the instrument used to cap-
ture emotion in the first place. We deliberately avoided
an extra step asking players to annotate their own emo-
tion, as this would cause more cognitive load and bias
the ToM annotation due to ordering effects. However,
future work could explore ways of collecting ground
truth data on the emotional state of the players without
increasing the difficulty of the annotation task.
Finally, while this first study focused only on game-
play metrics and facial features, future work could ex-
tend the data collection to other modalites. This study
also collected a number of physiological signals (heart
rate variability and electrodermal activity), but due to
varying signal quality we chose to omit them from this
paper. Improved ways of collecting physiological sig-
nals, gaze tracking, or other ways to process the fea-
tures in a relative fashion such as average gradient per
time window [8] could lead to more robust predictive
models, and should be further investigated.
8 Conclusions
This paper examined a player’s theory of mind regard-
ing an agent’s simulated frustration. The MAZING test-
bed game was created explicitly towards this end, in-
spired by the theory of computer frustration. Results
from a small-scale study with 20 players gave us a rich
dataset of granular annotations of perceived agent frus-
tration, as well as 53 features of gameplay and players’
facial expressions. The analysis of the results indicated
that a player’s first-order representation of the agent’s
state is largely a cognitive process. Further, emotional
responses were deemed unreliable in modelling player
ToM, as relying solely on gameplay features yields mod-
els of significantly higher accuracies compared to mod-
els based on facial features.
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